Lingnan University 嶺南大學 香港 Hong Kong
Hong Kong Catastrophic Risk Centre

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Hybrid Research Seminar

Objective Versus Epistemic Accounts of Modal Risk

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One influential objection to the modal account of risk argues that the theory is practically useless because it requires that to assess the risk of a proposition one must first take a prior view on its truth. I agree with Duncan Pritchard that this objection fails; however, Pritchard's response entails that there are two radically different versions of the modal account, that is, objective versus epistemic accounts of modal risk. In this talk, I first critique Pritchard's version of the modal account of risk. I then give a novel counterexample to objective accounts of modal risk. Lastly, I develop a new epistemic account of modal risk.

Venue
LKK205

Meeting ID: **983 1951 5823**
Passcode: **26167445**

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More Info: https://www.ln.edu.hk/philoso/events
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26 Oct 2026
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